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Abstract
The Eritrea-Ethiopia peace process remains stalled a decade after the arbitral 
award by the Boundary Commission and several years after awards by the 
Claims Commission. This article assesses why arbitration by the two 
commissions did not produce the desired outcome. To this end, the author 
analyzes primary and secondary sources and argues that arbitration was not the 
right method of conflict resolution. Mayer’s multi-dimensional approach to 
conflict and conflict resolution informs the discussion that the conflict between 
the two countries has cognitive, emotional and behavioral dimensions. It is 
argued that arbitration as a settlement of dispute by purely legal means is 
ineffective to adequately address the multiple dimensions of the conflict. The 
author underscores that such conflicts can only be resolved by using a 
combination of different interventions. Specifically, while arbitration may be 
appropriate to deal with some essentially resource related matters, the 
resolution of emotional and cognitive dimensions of this conflict call for a 
multi-track approach in which different segments of the people from the two 
countries can play critical roles.
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Introduction
Ethiopia and Eritrea ‘sought’ to resolve all aspects of their conflict by 
arbitration. To this end, they established Boundary and Claims Commissions. 
Although the two Commissions have given awards in respect of all the matters 
submitted to them, none of these awards have been implemented. What is 
worse, the two countries still remain on a war footing. The author contends that 
this is in part attributable to the ineffectiveness of arbitration as the sole 
mechanism to resolve the conflict.
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The first section of the article highlights the meaning and causes of conflict 
and sheds some light on interstate conflict. Section 2 introduces the states at 
conflict and the relationship between the leaderships of the two countries. 
Particularly, the multiple underlying causes of the conflict are discussed. In 
Section 3, the claims litigated before the two arbitral tribunals and the awards 
given are presented in brief. The fourth section demonstrates the mismatch 
between arbitration and the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict. The last section, examines 
the parallels between the conflict resolution scheme and the dimensions of 
conflict. Then, a few observations are stated as to how resolution of the conflict 
between the two countries should be attempted.
As regards methodology, a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods has 
been utilized. it should, however, be noted from the outset that participants in 
the field study do not necessarily represent the populations of the two countries. 
The objective of this article is not to generalize about the entire populations of 
the two countries directly from the sample. The aim of the sample is rather 
limited to shedding some light on the views and feelings of certain influential 
segments of the societies in the countries at conflict and those that were 
particularly affected by the conflict. This being the objective, the participants 
were for the most part people living close to the border, refugees from Eritrea, 
Ethiopian deportees from Eritrea, persons who were considered opinion makers 
and others.
1. Conflicts in General and Interstate Conflict: An Overview
1.1. Conflict: Meaning and Causes
Conflict has different meanings in different contexts. For some it refers to 
‘behavior’ or ‘action’. For instance, there is a conflict when a trade union goes 
on ‘strike’ or when two states are at ‘war’. According to Wallensteen if these 
events merely involved ‘actions’, conflict would be over when the behavior or 
action ends, say when war stops. He notes that conflict is rather a ‘social 
situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the 
same moment in time an available set of scarce resources’.1 In a bid to explain 
his definition he writes, one needs to note elements like ‘strive’ and ‘scarce 
resources’. The word strive refers to the parties doing ‘something’ however 
minimal to acquire the resource. So strive includes anything, ‘war’ being its 
highest form. He further states that the notion of ‘available set of scarce 
resources’ should be interpreted broadly to include non-material/non-economic 
resources. Accordingly, the term ‘resources’ covers all kinds of positions that
1 Peter Wallensteen (2007), Understanding Conflict Resolution (London and Thousand 
Oaks: SAGE Publications Limited, 2nd ed), p. 15.
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are of interest to an actor. So it can, inter alia, include territory, position of 
power, acceptance of responsibility for destructive actions, psychological needs 
like retribution and other intangible values.2
Johan Galtung proposes an influential model regarding how conflict takes 
place. According to this model, ‘conflict’ can be viewed as a triangle with 
attitude (A), behavior (B) and contradiction(C) at its vertices. “Attitude” refers 
to disposition towards an adversary and has two elements, the cognitive and 
emotive. The cognitive element refers to the mental image one holds about the 
enemy while the emotive element relates to the affect or emotions, the feelings 
one has towards an adversary3. “B”, the behavioral dimension refers to what 
parties do such as gestures signifying cooperation or/and coercion. In violent 
conflicts the behavior could be violent attack.4 That will be war if it involves the 
coordinated use of violent force in combination with other instruments according 
to Clausewitz.5 Finally, “contradiction” in this model refers to the underlying 
conflict situation including actual and perceived ‘incompatibility of goals’ 
between the parties to the conflict. These three dimensions taken together make 
the conflict system wherein each reinforces the others.6 Conflict is a dynamic 
phenomenon. one actor is reacting to what another actor is doing, that further 
leads to yet another action to the extent that it may become difficult to decipher 
who is more responsible.7
1.2. Interstate Conflict: The Different Levels of Analysis
Many have grappled with the causes of interstate conflict and other forms of 
state behavior. Particularly, the causes of war have been analyzed in different 
ways. Waltz’s ‘level-of-analysis framework’ can be a useful tool in making 
sense of the varied understanding of causes of war and other state behavior. His 
level-of-analysis framework divides the causes of war in terms of whether they 
are located at the level of the individual, the nation-state or international 
system.8
2 Ibid.
3 Johan Galtung cited in Kenneth Fox (2007), “What Private Mediators Can Learn from 
the Peace- Builders”, Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 7, p. 245.
4 Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall (2005), Contemporary Conflict 
Resolution (Cambridge and Malden : Polity Press), p. 10.
5 Jack Levy (2007), “International Sources of Interstate and Intrastate War”, in Chester 
Crocker, Fen Hampson and Pamela Aall (edds) Leashing the Dogs of War 
(Washington: US Institute of Peace Press), p. 20.
6 Galtung, cited at note 3 above.
7 Wallensteen, supra note 1, p. 32.
8 Levy, supra note 5, p. 21.
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The first, the individual level, focuses primarily on human nature and
inclinations towards aggression. In this thinking, wars are ultimately clashes not
of armies, laws, or even cultures but of masses of individuals each of whom is a
distinct personality and whose behavior while affected by the command of the
superior officer, laws and symbols, is also affected by individual hereditary as
well as individual experiences.9 Hence, the personalities, belief systems,
psychological process of individuals, particularly, leaders such as heads of state
are subject of emphasis at this level of analysis. The implication of the
individual level of analysis could be that, if a different person had been the
leader, the state would have behaved differently; say would not have gone to
war.10 The second, the national level, considers wider factors and settings as
points of focus, such as the structure of the political system, policy making
process, the role of public opinion, interest groups, ethnicity and nationalism,
political culture and ideology.11 12 The third level, also called the system-level,
includes variables like the structure of the international system, number of major
powers in the system, norms influencing their behavior, patterns of international
trade and military alliance and other factors that constitute the external 
• 12environment to states.
At this juncture one notes that no single level of analysis provides a complete 
explanation for the causes of war given the complexity of international politics. 
Hence, many theories of war combine causal variables from different levels of 
analysis, i.e., the individual, nation-state, and systems level.13 Another point to 
be noted in this connection is that showing or explaining why a state or a leader 
wants war is not enough. Since interstate war involves violence between two 
political organizations, a theory of war must explain why both states fight. For 
this reason, a complete analysis will not be achieved solely at ‘individual’ or 
state level. Analysis of a war at the system level becomes inevitable where more 
than one country will have to be studied.14 In this article, the focus of analysis 
will be at the nation-state level though the other two levels have undeniably 
their own contributions.
According to Mayer, nation-state level conflicts could be viewed as 
occurring along three dimensions; these are cognitive (perception), emotional
9 Quincy Wright (1964), A Study of War, (2nd Abridged ed.), (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press), p. 112.
10 Levy, supra note 5, pp. 20-21.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., p. 22
14 Ibid., p. 23.
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(feeling/identity) and behavioral (action) dimensions.15 These are essentially the 
elements that make two of the three vertices of Galtung’s triangle stated above. 
The cognitive and emotional dimensions constitute the ‘attitude’ vertex while 
the behavioral dimension in Mayer’s analysis is exactly the same as the 
‘behavior’ vertex in Galtung’s triangle. Mayor’s three dimensions will inform 
the analysis of the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict where necessary in the course of the 
discussion in the following sections.
2. An Overview of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Conflict: the Parties 
and Underlying Causes
The 1998-2000 ‘border’ war represents the highest point in the current Eritrea- 
Ethiopia conflict. It also provided the setting for a multitude of violations of 
humanitarian and human rights laws that were brought before the Eritrea- 
Ethiopia Claims Commission. But did Ethiopia and Eritrea really fight over the 
disputed territory which some called ‘inconsequential piece of real estate’ owing 
to the small size and absence of known resources? How is it possible for two 
formerly ‘friendly’ governments to turn into deadly adversaries in a matter of 
weeks, willing to sacrifice tens of thousands of their people on the battlefields? 
Why is it that we have simmering tensions between the two countries a decade 
after the ceasefire and an arbitral award on the ‘disputed border’ has been 
given? Why did the awards by the Claims Commission on the consequences of 
the war fail to be implemented? Even more so, why are these arbitral awards 
used as propaganda tools for what one may call a ‘cold war’?
An international dispute is not an isolated event. it has a past and presumably 
some sort of a future.16 It cannot be understood independently of its historical 
context. According to Mayer, “the history of the people who are participants in a 
conflict, of the system in which the conflict is occurring and of the issues 
themselves has a powerful influence on the course of the conflict”.17 This 
observation is particularly correct regarding the conflict between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia. Hence, a proper understanding of the conflict and the way forward 
presupposes having an in-depth knowledge of the two countries, their peoples as 
well as the leaderships at conflict. Unfortunately, it is impossible to do justice to 
such broad and complex subjects in an article like this. Therefore, only a cursory 
look at the relationship between the two countries, their people and the political 
leadership will be attempted.
15 Bernard Mayer (2000), The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide 
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), p. 4.
16 Jacob Bercovittch (1996), Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice 
of Mediation (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers), p.16.
17 Mayer, supra note 15, p. 13.
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2.1. The Relationship between the Two People and 
Countries
Ethiopia and Eritrea occupy most of the Horn of Africa. Eritrea has a land and 
sea area of about 117,600 square kilometers and a population of about 6 million. 
Ethiopia is relatively a big country, almost ten times the size of Eritrea and a 
population of about 93 million.18 Ethiopia lost the entire coastline along the Red 
Sea upon the independence of Eritrea in 1993. Thus, Ethiopia is landlocked 
whereas Eritrea has a coastline of 1200 kilometers.19
Since some two thousand years back, most of today’s Tigray and much of 
Eritrea saw intensive intercommunication of various peoples. The intermingling 
of ‘humans, animals, plants cultures and ideas across the Red Sea produced a 
distinct civilization that can be deemed Afro-Asiatic’. Its heartland was Axum, 
the antecedent of the modern Ethiopian state.20 Owing to this, there are 
primordial ties between various ethnic groups living in both countries. For 
instance, four of the nine languages spoken in Eritrea are widely spoken in
Ethiopia.21
This is particularly clear when it comes to the Tigrigna-speaking community 
straddling the border between the two countries. The Tigrayans and Eritreans of 
the southern highlands (kebesa) spoke the same language, Tigrigna. They use 
the same script, and belonged to the same political realm and Orthodox Church 
with its Geez liturgy. Moreover, these two people shared the same agrarian 
culture and social hierarchy.22 Common people on both sides of the Mereb River 
admit the existence of this close cultural, ethnic and linguistic ties although 
individuals from different walks of life accord slightly different weight and 
meaning to those relationships.23
while the above commonalities inform the historical and cultural similarities 
of the peoples of both countries to this day, the two countries have a period of
18 CIA, The World Factbook: available at
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/html>, accessed 
on August 3, 2012.
19 Berhane Woldegabriel (2006), ‘A War for National Unity’ in Lenco Leeta (ed), The 
Search for Peace: The Conflict Between Ethiopia and Eritrea, July 2006, available at: 
<www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/20014/20014.pdf>, accessed on May 29, 2012.
20 Gebru Tareke (2009), The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press), p. 55. See also Alemseged Abbay (1998), Identity 
Jilted, or, Re-Imagining Identity? The divergent paths of the Eritrean and Tigrayan 
Nationalist Struggles, (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press).
21 Berhane, supra note 19, p. 34.
22 Gebru, supra note 20, p.55.
23 Alemseged, supra note 20, p. 160.
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separate history, which the political leadership of both have played up or played 
down depending on their political aspirations.24 Here it should be noted that 
some Eritrean sources totally disagree with any assertion that Eritrea was ever 
part of Ethiopia. Although they agree most parts of Eritrea were part and parcel 
of the Axumite kingdom, they contend that the Ethiopian state cannot and 
should not be deemed to be the inheritor of the Axumite kingdom.25 In the more 
recent past, while Ethiopia remained independent, Eritrea was colonized by Italy 
from 1891 to 1941.26 Subsequently, Eritrea was under British rule from 1941 to 
1952.27
In December 1950 the United Nations General Assembly by Resolution 390 
A(V) decided that Eritrea be grated autonomous federal status under the 
sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown not later than 15 September 1952. Many 
Eritreans question the legitimacy of this decision. Ruth, an Eritrean intellectual 
for instance, contends that Ethiopia exploited traditional Eritrean societal 
cleavages and manipulated the nascent party politics prevalent at the time in 
Eritrea.28 The societal cleavages that she talks about refer to highland-lowland, 
Christian-Muslim dichotomy that is raised by several authors in relation to this. 
Particularly, a considerable segment of the Muslim community opposed the 
Federal arrangement.29 Whether Ruth’s interpretations are correct or not it is 
incontestable that the people of Eritrea did not vote on this issue of federation 
with Ethiopia. Both Eritrean and Ethiopian sources confirm this.30
24 Tekeste Negash (1997), Eritrea andEthiopia:The Federal Experience, (New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers), p. 13.
25 Othman Saleh Sabby, The History of Eritrea, available at: 
<www.eritrios.net/the_history_of_eritrea.htm>, accessed on August 3, 2012. The author who 
was one of the founders of the Eritrean Liberation Front and the official 
spokesperson for the external mission of the Popular Liberation Forces of Eritrea 
contends that Eritrea is part of the Arab homeland, which the sea could not separate 
from the Arab Peninsula.
26 Tekeste, supra note 24, p. 13.
27 Ibid, p. 18.
28 Ruth iyob (1995), The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domination, Resistance, 
Nationalism (New York: Cambridge University Press), p. 86.
29 Tekeste Negash (2007), ‘The Dilemma of Eritrean Identity and Its Future 
Trajectories' A Paper read at the 4th Congress of the Association of African 
Historians, May 2007, read generally, available at:
<http://asmarino.com/en/articles/242-the-dilemma-of-eritrean-identity-and-its-future- 
trajectories>, accessed on June 14, 20012.
30 Bereket Habte Selassie (1989), Eritrea and the United Nations (Lawrenceville: Red 
Sea Press), p.27, See also Bahru Zewde (2006), ‘Eritrea and Ethiopia: In Quest of a 
Culture of Peace and Dialogue ’ in Lenco Leeta (ed.), supra note 19, p.17.
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Once federation was attained, the federal arrangement that aimed at 
satisfying unionist and pro-independence segments of the Eritrean society was 
found unsatisfactory to both sides. According to Bahru the Unionists that had 
the upper hand in the newly constituted Eritrean Government systematically 
eroded the federal arrangement excelling in zeal the Government in Addis 
Ababa.31 Bahru further writes that the Emperor welcomed and even encouraged 
these developments because the federal arrangement was an anomaly given the 
centralized, autocratic, feudal system in Ethiopia.32 Finally, in 1962 the federal 
arrangement was abolished when the Eritrean Parliament voted for unitary 
system, which according to many Eritrean sources resulted from the pressure 
and intrigue exerted by Emperor Haileselassie.33
This resulted in liberation struggle by several Eritrean groups, which led to 
30 years of civil war or ‘liberation war’ according to many Eritreans. This war 
brought untold misery to the people of both countries.34 In April 1993, Eritrea 
gained de jure independence following a UN sponsored referendum held on 
April 23/24. Ethiopia extended recognition to Eritrea’s sovereignty and 
independence on April 29, 1993 just two days after the results of the referendum 
were announced and three weeks before the independence of Eritrea was 
formally declared.35
2.2. The Relationship between the Leaderships of the Two 
Countries
The parties in power in both countries, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, 
TPLF, now subsumed into the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic 
Front, EPRDF, and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, EPLF, now renamed 
People’s Front for Democracy and Justice, PFDJ, were guerrilla organizations 
fighting in close cooperation for nearly 17 years. As guerrilla movements, their 
major power base was the same ethnic group, Tigray/Tigriya found in both
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Bereket Habte Sellassie, supra note 30, p. 43.
34 Ruth Iyob (1995), supra note 28, p.96.
35 Ruth Eyob (2000), “The Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict, Diasporic vs. Hegemonic States 
in the Horn of Africa”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 38, No 4, p. 670, 
See also Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, Decision Regarding Delimitation 
of the Border between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Decision of 13 April 2002, p. 105, 
available at: <www.untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXV/83-195.pdf>, accessed 
on August 3, 2012.
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countries. What is more, after the two organizations came to power, the party 
now in power in Ethiopia facilitated and endorsed Eritrea’s independence.36
Notwithstanding the above facts, those who have studied the two 
organizations closely have maintained that the two parties had disputes on a 
range of ideological, military as well as national questions. Aregawi Berhe, one 
of the founders of the TPLF and member of the leadership until 1985, confirms 
the above. According to him, the TPLF-EPLF relationship was amorphous from 
the very beginning. in his view, it was by and large the pressure from the 
common enemy that propelled the relationship to work to the extent it did.37
When the two fronts were fighting the Dergue, the most enduring 
disagreements between the two pertained to differing points of view on the 
nature of the soviet union, the question of nationality, and military strategy to 
be applied for combating the Dergue.38 Regarding the question of nationality, 
for instance, the major point of difference was that the TPLF insisted officially 
that if post-independence Eritrea was to be democratic it would have to 
recognize and respect the rights of nations and nationalities in Eritrea to self­
determination including and up to secession.39 As Eritrea has nine ethnic groups, 
unlike nearly homogenous Tigray, this stand of the TPLF did not suit the vision 
EPLF had for Eritrea.40
In 1985, these tense circumstances led to the withdrawal of TPLF’s last 
contingent from the Eritrean trenches in Sahel where they had been deployed to 
help the EPLF. Months later, the EPLF retaliated by taking a series of measures 
that angered not only the TPLF but many Tigrayans from different walks of life. 
The measures included blocking the TPLF from using the only route to the 
sudan from where the food aid to the population suffering from one of the worst 
famines would be obtained, and closing the ‘Dimtsi Woyane’, a TPLF radio 
operating from EPLF territory in Sahel. These measures led to a complete 
breakdown of relationship between the two and the TPLF began openly 
supporting various splinter groups of ELF against EPLF.41 The TPLF and EPLF
36 Kjetil Tronvoll (2009), War and Politics of Identity in Ethiopia (Chippenham:
Boydell and Brewer Inc.), p. 46.
37 Aregawi Berhe (2009), A Political History of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front 
(1997-1991) (Los Angeles: Tsehai Publishing and Distributors), p.210.
38 Ibid, p.218.
39 John Young (1996), ‘The Tigrayan and Eritrean Eritrean Liberation Fronts: A History 
of Tensions and Pragmatism’, The Journal of Modern African Studies 34(1), (105) p. 
112.
40 Ibid
1 Aregawi Berhe, supra note 37, p. 220.
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resumed relations only after April 1988 when they agreed to put aside their 
propaganda and attacks against each other, and to fight the Dergue together.42
2.3. The 1998-2000 War: The Underlying Causes
As indicated earlier, conflict may be viewed as occurring along cognitive 
(perception), emotional (feeling), and behavioral (action) dimensions.43 As 
Mayer notes “conflict among groups clearly has cognitive, affective, as well as 
behavioral dimensions” even if “we might better use terms like culture, ethos, 
public opinion or popular beliefs to signify the greater complexity and different 
nature of these dimensions in social systems”.44 This three-dimensional 
perspective, as stated above, essentially conforms to Galtung’s triangle of 
conflict. This perspective can explain the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict.
2.3.1. The behavioral dimension of the conflict
The behavioral or action dimension of conflict, consists of actions that people 
take to get their needs met in ways that have the potential for interfering with 
someone else’s ability to get his/her needs met.45 At this juncture one recalls 
‘striving’ in Wallensteen’s definition of conflict discussed above. In other 
words, this refers to parties ‘doing something’, however minimal, in ways that 
have the potential to limit the share of the other in the ‘pie’ (scarce resource) 
which is sought after by two states.46
Some real issues lurking behind the border conflict form this behavioral 
dimension of the conflict. These include unsettled issues of economic 
relationship and citizenship of people of Eritrean origin. For seven years 
following Eritrea’s independence, the two countries had an extensive economic 
relationship. Ethiopia continued to use the ports of Assab and Massawa. Hence, 
Eritrea gained port fees and charges which by 1997 amounted to a total of
42 Medhane Tadesse (1999), The Eritrean-Ethiopian War: Retrospect and Prospects 
(Addis Ababa: Mega Printing Enterprise), p. 50, See also, John Young (1997), 
Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), p. 156, Richard Reid (2003), ‘Old Problems in New 
Conflicts: Some Observations on Eritrea and Its Relations with Tigray, from 
Liberation Struggle to Inter-State War’, Africa: Journal of the International African 
Institute 73(3), p.375.
43 Bernard Mayer, supra note 15, p. 13.
44 Ibid, p. 6.
45 Bernard Mayer, supra note 15, p. 5.
46 Peter Wallensteen, supra note 1, p 15.
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22.6% of total public revenue excluding external grants.47 Moreover, close to 
300,000 Eritreans got direct and indirect employment opportunities in Ethiopia 
because of the close relationship between the two countries.48 An estimated 60­
80% of Eritrean exports were destined to Ethiopia before the war erupted as its 
products did not meet the standards required in Europe or neighboring Gulf 
markets49. What is more, the two countries used the same currency until Eritrea 
introduced its own in 1997.50
The two countries had concluded a number of agreements on trade, transit 
and port services, communication, transportation and the like although these 
agreements were not comprehensive.51 Moreover, there were spheres which 
were not clearly agreed upon. For instance, there was no clear official articulation 
or exchange of ideas about how to resolve problems resulting from differences 
in national economic plans, access to markets, currency exchange rates and the 
nature of this relationship and the benefits that accrue to the people of each 
country.52 Although the two countries had signed an agreement on the 
harmonization of economic policies on September 23, 1993, it showed some 
signs of incompatibility from the outset and caused grievances. Particularly, 
people in the two countries viewed the commodity trade sector, the monetary 
arrangement, Eritrea’s new currency and issues of citizenship differently.53
47 Gote Hansson (2001), ‘Building New States: Lessons from Eritrea’, Discussion Paper 
No. 2001/66 presented at United Nations University World Institute for 
Development Economics Research, p. 11.
48 Gilbert Khadiagala (1999), ‘Reflections on the Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict’, The 
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs XXIII, No. 2, p. 43.
49 Ross Herbert, The End of the Eritrean Exception? The South African Institute of 
International Affairs, 2002, Country Report No. 8, p 17 available at: 
http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/29833/1/Country%20Report 
%20No%208.pdf?1, accessed on August 4, 2012.
50 Ibid, p. 9.
51 Trade Agreement and Trade Protocol between the Transitional Government of 
Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea( Sep 27, 1993), Transit and Port 
Services Agreement between the Transitional Government and the Government of 
the State of Eritrea( Sep 27, 1993), Protocol Agreement on Transport and 
Communications between the Transitional Government of Ethiopia and the 
Government of the State of Eritrea( Sep 27, 1993), Air Services Agreement between 
the Transitional Government of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea( 
Sep 27, 1993).
52 Abebe Zegeye and Melakou Tegeng (2007), The Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict: A 
Critical Observation (Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue), p. 18.
53 Ibid.
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a) The commodity trade sector
One feature of the harmonization agreement was that it provided for free re­
export of goods imported from third countries. Thus, for instance, Eritreans 
could export to Ethiopia products they imported, say, from China or india 
without having to pay Ethiopian customs duty and vice versa. Since the two 
countries did not have common external tariff, this resulted in grievances on the 
part of Ethiopian businesses. This was due to the very low external tariff of 
Eritrea as compared to Ethiopia. Because of this difference in tariff rates 
Eritrean businesspersons could import goods from third countries through 
Eritrea and sell them in Ethiopia without paying the high tariff their Ethiopian 
counterparts paid. This gave them a competitive edge over Ethiopians in the 
Ethiopian market and caused bitter complaints. Various Eritrean writers, 
however, expressed a totally different view. According to Alemseged, this 
arrangement benefited Ethiopia more because, the goods re-exported to Ethiopia 
were bought using meager Eritrean hard currency but sold for Ethiopians in 
Birr, a soft currency.54
The other feature of the harmonization agreement was that it provided for 
free movement of goods and services except those that were in short supply 
between the two countries. The Eritrean side found this restriction on “goods in 
short supply”, which was an Ethiopian inclusion, difficult to understand and 
work with. The complaint was that any product could be so declared at any time, 
thus hampering free trade in goods.55 The complaint on the Ethiopian side was 
that Eritrea was abusing the agreement in respect of free movement of goods to 
export Ethiopian products to third countries and thus getting hard currency at the 
expense of Ethiopia in contravention of another provision of the treaty that 
prohibited such conduct. The perception of certain sections of the Ethiopian 
society was that Eritrea had become one of the ‘biggest exporters of coffee’ in 
the world although it does not grow coffee at all.56 For instance, Capital, a 
weekly Ethiopian Newspaper in its March 20, 2011 issue states that Eritrea 
ranked the 13 th biggest exporter of coffee before the outbreak of the 1998 war 
although it does not produce coffee at all.57 Such perceptions complicated 
relations even if they were at times exaggerated.
54 Alemseged Tesfai, The Cause of Eritrean-Ethiopian Conflict, available at: 
<http://www.denden.com/Conflict/newscom/com-alem98.html>, accessed on August 
7, 2012.
55 Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvol (2000), Brothers at War: Making Sense of the 
Eritrean Ethiopian War (Ohio University Press), p. 32.
56 Abebe Zegeye and Melakou Tegeng, supra note 52, p19.
57 Solomon Bekele, ‘Africa: the continent of billionaires’, Capital , Year 13, Issue 
640, p 32.
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Due to the foregoing reasons, it was clear by 1996 that the implementation of 
the 23 protocols signed by the two countries in 1993 was greatly hampered.58 A 
joint review committee was thus set up. Tekeste and Tronvoll summarize the 
problems identified by the committee as follows:59 60
i. Restrictions had been imposed on Eritrea’s import of Ethiopia’s 
exportable products.
ii. There was a serious lack of adequate institutional mechanisms to 
implement the agreements reached.
iii. No action had been taken to combat illegal trade.
iv. Several types of local charges and intermediate payments had been introduced.
v. Licensing systems were different and discriminatory.
b) The monetary arrangement
Pursuant to Article 1 of the Harmonization Agreement, the two countries used 
the Ethiopian currency (the Birr) until Eritrea issued its currency in November 
1997.60 The view in Eritrea was that Ethiopia benefited more from this 
arrangement. For Eritreans, using the Birr meant de facto currency union, 
without however allowing Eritrea voice in Ethiopia’s conduct of monetary 
policy, thereby putting Eritrea at a disadvantage. This was the case, it is 
maintained, because the interest rates set by the National Bank of Ethiopia was 
not necessarily appropriate to business conditions in Eritrea.61 Second, without 
its own currency, Eritrea had no seignorage revenue,62 and this factor was 
regarded as an important consideration given the need to finance reconstruction 
and development spending.
Ethiopia on the other hand viewed this arrangement as relatively more 
beneficial to Eritrea. The view was that Eritrea was paying in soft currency, i.e, 
in Birr, for Ethiopian products as well as for products Ethiopia imported using 
its meager hard currency. The result of all this led to a deeply held belief that 
Eritrea was siphoning off Ethiopia’s economic resources.63 The pressure on the 
Ethiopian government thus was to require Eritrea as a sovereign country to shop 
around for resources in the same way as Ethiopia does.
58 Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll , supra note 55, p. 33.
59 Ibid.
60 Alemseged Tesfai, supra note 54.
61 Hansson, supra note 47, p. 7.
62 This is the profit obtained from minting coins/printing money if the cost of producing 
say a bill or coin is less than the worth of the bill or coin as the case may be. it is 
possible for the costs to exceed the value of the coin, in which case the government 
will incur loss.
<http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/seigniorage.asp#axzz22qtWBqoa>, accessed 
on August 7, 2012.
63 Ruth Iyob (2000), supra note 35, p. 667.
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c) Eritrea’s introduction of new currency
In 1997 Eritrea introduced its own currency, Nakfa. This, according to Eritrean 
authorities, was necessitated by the divergent fiscal, trade and investment 
policies the two countries had begun to follow. There was lack of transparency 
in the way the Nakfa was introduced. For instance, no understanding was 
reached about its relationship to the Ethiopian Birr. Thus, when the currency 
began to circulate, the Ethiopian government refused Eritrea’s request for 
Nakfa-Birr parity. It asked Eritrea to conduct trade using hard currency and 
Letter of Credit (LC) unless it merely involves border trade not exceeding 2000 
Birr.64 Eritrea rejected Ethiopia’s proposal to trade by Letter of Credit. 65
According to some Eritreans, the Nakfa-Birr parity ‘controversy’ was 
actually an Ethiopian creation. All Eritrea requested was ‘free convertibility’, 
i.e., to give traders in both countries the opportunity to agree on the use of the 
currency of their choice for settlement. It did not request parity of the two 
currencies.66 Other Eritreans admit that Eritrea did request the parity of the two 
currencies. Moreover, they allege that Ethiopia had accepted that or at least 
‘Eritrean officials had naively believed’ it before the issuance of the Nakfa.67 
The contention that Eritrea did not request Nakfa-Birr parity seems to be a post- 
facto argument aimed at buttressing the stand of Eritrea on this issue as the 
demand for party was found to be flying in the face of logic.
d) The Issue of citizenship
The two countries have divergent laws regarding the issue of nationality. Eritrea 
recognizes anyone of Eritrean parentage on paternal or maternal side as its 
citizen. In fact, the Eritrean law envisages the possibility of having multiple 
citizenships although some extra procedures have to be complied with,68 while 
Ethiopia does not. According to Article 11 of the 1930 Ethiopian nationality law 
(that was in force at the time of the conflict), any person who acquires another 
citizenship immediately forgoes Ethiopian citizenship. Since the two countries 
never took legal steps to put matters to rest in this regard, problems began 
arising. The problem was broad, as all Eritreans had Ethiopian citizenship and
64 Hansson, supra note 47, p.11.
65 University of Pennsylvania African Studies Center, Horn of Africa Monthly Review, 
3-4/98, March to April 8, 1997 issue, available at:
<http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/HOA0398p.html> accessed on August 7, 2012.
66 Alemseged Tesfai, The Causes of Eritrean Ethiopian Conflict, supra note 54.
67 Ruth Iyob (2000), supra note 35, p. 674.
68 The Eritrean Nationality Proclamation no 21/1992, Art 2(5) available at: 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b4e026.html> accessed on Aug. 4, 2012.
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no arrangements were set in place to identify who among them have adopted 
Eritrean citizenship.69
Thus, in the Joint High Ministerial Commission, Ethiopia voiced its concern 
over a significant number of Eritreans still carrying Ethiopian passports and 
requesting renewals. This situation created problems especially in the issuance 
of licenses for investment in sectors such as the banking and insurance 
industries reserved for Ethiopian nationals alone. To put it simply, the Ethiopian 
side felt that Eritreans were taking unfair advantage of the free movement, 
residence and business agreements by being treated as nationals in both countries 
while Ethiopians were not. Some Ethiopians were particularly resentful because 
Eritrea had, in 1991-2, expelled about 120,000 Ethiopians without meaningful 
protection to their rights.70
Establishing the veracity of each allegation above is not the purpose of this 
article. Its objective is limited to showing the kind of behavioral issues that were 
lurking behind the border war.
2.3.2. The emotional dimension of the conflict
The emotional dimension refers to an emotional reaction to a situation that 
signals a disagreement of some kind.71 At the foundation of this dimension is the 
contention that men and groups do not act only, or in fact to a large measure, to 
achieve conscious objectives. In other words, subconscious or unconscious 
attitudes and behavior patterns constitute their more important aspects. In this 
view, behind the state is the nation. The latter implies a group whose members 
feel as a unit of some kind and react spontaneously in ways that can cause and 
perpetuate war or lesser forms of conflict in response to encroachment, real or 
imagined.72 Wars, therefore, can be considered in some cases as clashes between 
identity groups.
This third, emotional/identity dimension of international conflict began to get 
attention in recent decades. Instead of viewing international conflict as struggles 
over resources only or ‘as the hard shells of nation-states bouncing off each 
other’, a new view suggested that conflicts ‘were just as often struggles within 
and between nations over contending ideologies, values, needs and most 
fundamentally, identities.’ In this context, identity represents “people’s need to 
preserve a sense of who they are and what their place in the world is”, and it 
plays a major role in conflict.73 When a group is in conflict or at war with a
69 Ruth Iyob (2000), supra note 35, p. 664.
70 Ross Herbert, supra note 49 p. 32.
71 Mayor, supra note 15, p. 5.
72 Wright, supra note 9, p. 111.
73 Mayer, supra note 15, p.19.
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neighbor, group members become acutely aware of their large group identity to 
the point where it may far outweigh any concern for individual needs, even 
survival.74 Hence, members of the group rally around a leader without 
questioning his leadership.75
in other words, the new assumption is that the need for recognition, meaning 
and self-esteem, as well as the need to be ‘right’ could be the root cause of 
conflict. So, in this outlook, the economic man fighting to produce or control 
resource is viewed as a full-blooded being with hopes, fears, goals, values, 
needs and identities. So, identity is now a focus in conflict analysis and 
resolution.76
According to analysts who regard self-image or identity as a crucial factor in 
conflicts, there is the rigidity of a group’s need to be ‘right’ about the other and 
the events surrounding the conflict, and there is also a desire to place the blame, 
for what caused the conflict and what happened during the conflict, on the other 
group in the conflict. The analysts maintain that there is a reflexive reaction to 
put all the responsibility onto the ‘aggressive and evil other’ to protect one’s 
righteous self-image. This mutual deflection of responsibility by the two groups 
in conflict is a powerful reaction to protect one’s self-image or identity and to 
protect oneself from the trauma related with conflict. This is an aspect of the 
emotional dimension of conflict causing and fueling conflicts.77
But can countries be in conflict along the emotional or identity dimension? 
Mayer answers this in the positive and rightly so. The Ethio-Eritrean conflict 
has this dimension. However, this is not meant to say that everyone in the two 
countries had similar emotions. Mayer’s caution in this regard is pertinent. He 
notes that when one says two countries are at conflict along the emotional 
dimension it does not mean that every individual member of each country shares 
the same feelings or even that the majority do. It rather means that the conflict 
evokes certain reactions and attitudes from the dominant leaders or a significant 
number of people in each country.78 This point should be particularly 
emphasized in the Ethiopian context. Given the size and diversity of the country
74 Vamik Volkan (1997), Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism (New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux), p. 25.
75 Ibid, p. 27.
76 Jay Rothman and Marie Olson (2001), ‘From Interests to Identities: Towards a New 
Emphasis in Interactive Conflict Resolution’, Journal of Peace Research 38(3), at 
pp.294-295.
77 Donna Hicks (2001), ‘The Role of Identity Reconstruction in Promoting 
Reconciliation’, in Raymond Helmick and Rodney Petersen (eds.), Forgiveness and 
Reconciliation, (Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press), p.139.
78 Mayer, supra note 15, p.7.
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and its people, some sections of the Ethiopian society had little emotional 
involvement in the conflict.79
In the course of examining the Ethio-Eritrean conflict, one is struck by the 
anger, pride, betrayal and generalized hostility it has entailed. Thus, Ethiopian- 
Eritrean discourse both formal and informal has been acrimonious and revolves 
around the emotive issue of ‘betrayal’.80 Participants of the field study confirm 
this observation. Asked how much role emotions played in fueling the 1998­
2000 war, an overwhelming number of Eritrean and Ethiopian respondents said 
it had a role. Of the 96 Eritreans that answered this question, 46 said emotions 
played very big role while 38 said they played big role. Only 8 respondents 
thought emotions did not play any role. So, 91.7% of Eritrean respondents 
replied that emotions had very big role, big role or some role in fueling the 
conflict. Ethiopian respondents too confirmed that emotions had significant role 
in the conflict. On the Ethiopian side 42 out of 70 respondents said emotions 
had very big role, 16 said they had big role while 2 respondents said they had 
some role. only 10 respondents said emotions had no role in fueling the war.
Regarding self-image or identity on the Ethiopian side, one notes significant 
section of the society feels a strong sense of pride over the country’s almost 
uninterrupted independence for long time. The victories achieved in several 
wars fought against the Turks, Egyptians, Mahdists, Italians, etc...who tried to 
invade the country, are gloriously remembered, and to some extent mystified. 
Some segments of the society justify this by ancient and biblical myths 
portraying Ethiopians as a chosen people.81 A military challenge by Eritrea, 
formerly only a province of Ethiopia, was therefore, an affront. In short, there 
was a high degree of symbolism involved in the war. Thus, for Ethiopians 
negotiating before Eritrea’s withdrawal from the territory it occupied by force 
was compromising their identity. The speech made just after the outbreak of the 
conflict by Ato Ghebru Asrat, President of the Regional State of Tigrai (during 
the period) illustrates this point. He said82:
.we will pay any kind of sacrifice, even if the war takes spans of 
generations. No force can invade us! Impossible! This is because 
Ethiopia means ‘anti-invasion’. An Ethiopian means one who dies for 
his honor and fights for freedom and independence.
79 Informal discussion with Ethiopians of diverse background indicates this fact. The 
Eritrean Government further extends this reality to portray the conflict as a conflict 
which does not involve most Ethiopians as such.
80 Ruth Iyob (2000), supra note 35, p.678.
81 William Scott (1993), The Sons of Sheba’s Race:African Americans and the Italo- 
Ethiopian War, 1935-41 (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press), p. 23.
82 Kjetil Tronvoll, supra note 36, p. 66.
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This feeling was shared by a significant number of Ethiopians. It was not 
uncommon to hear a common man treating the conflict as an affront to identity 
of Ethiopia and Ethiopians. Tronvol presents what an elderly peasant from the 
outskirts of Mekelle told him. The peasant said: “The present ‘habo’ (resolve in 
the face of difficulty) is even greater than in the past because Eritreans ... have 
shown their contempt for us by stating that they are better than we are, and have 
taken our land”. 83
The survey conducted by this author in Shire-Indaselassie and Addis Ababa 
confirmed the role of self-image and identity in the conflict. To assess the extent 
to which issues of self-image fueled the 1998-2000 war, four questions were put 
to participants of the study. They were asked whether the war was really a 
border war, and particularly what they thought on this issue during the war, 
whether or not ethnic/regional feelings were apparent during the war and the 
extent to which people felt the need to win the war irrespective of who started it. 
The answers to these questions indicated that the war was not really seen as a 
border war. For instance, 64 out of 68 Ethiopian respondents said the war was 
not a border war. 34 out of 62 participants said they felt the war was not a 
border war even at the time of the war. Moreover, 48 out of 69 respondents said 
ethnic or regional feelings were apparent during the war and 60 out of 68 
respondents said the need to win the war irrespective of who started it, played a 
very big role in fueling the conflict while the remaining 8 did agree this had a 
role but only ‘some’ role. Although the survey was not meant to make 
generalizations about the entire populations of the two countries, the figures 
indicate that the conflict, to a significant extent, involved issues of self-image 
and identity at least to certain segments of the societies.
As regards Eritrea, one notes that Eritreans, both at home and in diaspora are 
imbued with a strong sense of nationalism. According to some written and oral 
sources, Fascist propaganda and policy of divide and rule has succeeded in 
instilling the feeling of superiority in the Tigrigna speaking Eritrean urban elite 
against Ethiopians, but mainly over Tigray owing to its geographic and cultural 
proximity to Eritrea. The Italians were engaged in intensive propaganda which 
claimed that Eritreans were superior to the people south of the Mereb in 
‘intelligence, creativity, moral virtues and will-power’. It has been alleged that 
some archives in Rome indicate that in the last years of the 1930s the Italians 
went to the extent of banning intermarriage between people on the two sides of 
the Mereb, the justification being ‘biological difference’. Some contend that this 
racist propaganda appealed to some of the Eritrean urban elite hence they began
83 Ibid, p. 67.
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to develop a distorted self-image.84 In the course of solidifying the Eritrean self­
image, the EPLF has further reinforced this problem thereby steadily letting it 
develop into a political culture.85
Volkan’s view on identity formation seems to partly explain the Eritrean 
situation. According to him, a new nation may define its identity around a 
‘chosen trauma’ and/or ‘chosen glory.’ A ‘chosen trauma,’ as used by Volkan, 
reflects a large group’s unconsciously defining its identity by trans-generational 
transmission of injured selves infused with the memory of the ancestor’s 
trauma.86 Eritreans feel highly victimized by the Ethiopian state due to the 
heavy-handed and undemocratic methods that were used to emasculate and 
silence the opposition to unity, thus gradually alienating the Eritrean population. 
They had also experienced real and perceived discrimination in connection with 
jobs and other opportunities.87 As the Ethiopian state was using unrestrained 
power for thirty years in its attempt to suppress the separatist movement, many 
concur that the key element in the process of the formation of nationalism is a 
consensus that defines the common, and usually ‘alien enemy’. There is thus 
little question that modern Eritrean nationalism is a by-product of Ethiopian 
hegemonic domination, according to many sources.88
As a result of the identity formed around this collective victimization, many 
Eritreans saw the border conflict as another attempt to humiliate them. One of 
the questions put to Eritreans was whether the 1998-2000 war had the effect of 
opening old wounds caused by previous Ethiopian governments to the Eritrean 
people. Of the 90 Eritreans that answered this question 74 answered yes. They 
saw the 1998 war as a continuation of past injustice inflicted, in their view, by 
the Ethiopian state. This was a strong obstacle to negotiating a settlement.
The identity that Eritreans formed around their real and perceived 
achievements during the armed struggle for independence also contributed to the 
failure to negotiate a settlement to the conflict. As Volkan explains, ‘chosen 
glory,’ the mental representation of a historical event that induces feelings of 
success and triumph, can be a basis for identity of a large group. He observes
84 Medhane Tadesse, supra note 42, p. 36, See also Tekeste Negash, supra note 24,
p.16.
85 Peggy Hoyle (1997) Eritrean National Identity: The Role of Education and 
Constitution (Unpublished PhD dissertation at the University of North Carolina) p. 
56. See also Medhane, supra note 42, p. V and Tronvol, supra note 36, p.72.
86 Vamik Volkan, supra note 74, p.48.
87 Alemseged Abay, supra note 20, p. 224.
88 Ruth Iyob (1995), supra note 28, pp. 120-21. See also Hoyle supra note 85, p.57 and 
Medhanie supra note 42, p. V.
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that the shared mental representation of a war for independence is a powerful 
ethnic or large-group maker.89
This view is confirmed by other writers. Endowed with battle hardened 
military and self-confidence, Eritrea’s leader seemed eager to boost this national 
identity of Eritrea in every possible way. Particularly, the fact that Eritrea won 
its war of liberation has resulted in an elevated sense of national identity and 
made it a very assertive country with an ambition to exert power regionally. In 
some ways, it is comparable to israel, a small nation that is very assertive.90 
Many believe this phenomenon contributed to the escalation of the conflict.
Some explain the very root cause of the war as identity dilemma. Alemseged 
Abay, whose book on Eritrean identity was published just before the outbreak of 
the conflict, has the following to say:
Created in reaction to genocidal-like state behavior of [Ethiopia], 
Eritrean-ness remains yet to be delivered. ... Massimo d’Azeglio, once 
said: ‘we have made Italy, now let us make Italians’. Making Eritreans 
and nurturing ‘Eritrean-ness’ demands self-definition and boundary 
delimitation. ... [I]dentity is inherently contrastive and needs the 
relevant other ... 91
He further contends that the Eritrean elite are searching for what Frederik Barth 
calls ‘border guards’ to separate Eritreans from Ethiopians. They have gone to 
the extent of renaming ethnic groups to create a rift between them and the same 
ethnic groups in Ethiopia. Other authors concur that concerted and conscious 
effort was made to ‘write a liberation history.’ Still others go to the extent of 
explaining the motive for the war itself as the desire to strengthen separate 
Eritrean identity.92
There is no way of telling whether the war was aimed at creating emotional 
scars strong enough to draw a wedge between the two people. That the war 
created emotional scars is, however, evident. The field study confirmed that the 
conflict was rife with emotions on the Eritrean side. Asked whether the 1998­
2000 war was really a border war, 84 out of 96 Eritrean respondents said it was 
not. They were further asked whether ethnic or regional feelings were apparent 
during the war, to which 68 out of 86 persons (who responded to this question) 
said yes, while 21% answered no. Asked to what extent the desire to win the 
war, irrespective of who started it, fuelled the war, 72 out of 90 respondents said 
such feelings played a very big role, while 10 respondents said it played some
89 Volkan, supra note 74, p. 82.
90 Khadiagala, supra note 48, p. 43.
91 Alemseged Abay, surpra note 20, p. 225.
92 Tekeste and Tronvoll, supra note 55, pp.30-31, See also Berhane, supra note 19, p. 
34. See also Alemseged Abay, supra note 20, p. 226.
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role. Only 4 out of 90 respondents answered that it had no role. Obviously, the 
sample was not really representative of the entire Eritrean public and hence no 
claim is being made about the exact proportion of Eritreans who shared these 
feelings. However, the figures reflect the emotional aspects of the war.
This was further confirmed by interviews conducted with Ethiopians who 
were ‘deported’ from Eritrea. Interviews with returnees confirmed that 
particularly after the fall of Barentu the biggest threat to their personal safety 
was the Eritrean public, especially the youth and militia. Angesom, who was 
born and raised in Gindai, a town between Asmara and Massawa, told me a 
compelling story of his own. He said he witnessed brutal beating of civilian 
Ethiopians. In fact, he himself had to run for his life into a police station.93 W/ro 
Tsaidu, an elderly deportee, told me of another incident. she said that when they 
were being transported to Ethiopia, the Eritrean public would throw stones at 
their buses. For instance, she said this happened at Maihabar.94 Almost all other 
interviewees in Adigrat and Mekelle confirmed that such occurrences were very 
prevalent after the fall of Barentu to Ethiopian forces, and this was particularly 
worse outside Asmara.
in light of the foregoing, the conflict should not be seen only as state-to-state 
conflict devoid of emotions and identity issues.
2.3.3. Cognitive dimension of the conflict
The cognitive dimension refers to a belief or understanding that one’s own 
‘needs, interests, wants or values are incompatible with someone else’s’.95 In 
other words, this refers to what the parties to a conflict think about the motives 
and activities of each other. It could, for example, be a belief in country ‘A’ that 
country ‘B’ is working to destabilize the former, and the vice-versa. This 
perception could cause and fuel conflict. At the root of this dimension of 
conflict is the sociological principle that “action always proceeds ... from the 
interpretation of conditions by decision makers. in other words, action comes 
from image in the mind”.96
On the part of Eritrea the perceptions were, to significant degree still are, that 
Ethiopia and Ethiopians still think Eritrea is by nature and logic part of Ethiopia 
and thus want Eritrea to fail as a sovereign entity.97 The views of Professor
93 Interview with Angessom Gebreanenia, Addigrat February 26, 2010. This 
interviewee also told me of the severe condition under which the returnees were 
detained and the various techniques the Eritrean authorities would use to avoid 
scrutiny of this by the Red Cross.
94 Interview with Wro Tsadu Berhe, Adigrat February 27, 2010.
95 Mayer, surpa note 15, p. 4.
96 Wright, supra note 9, p. 254.
97 Tekeste Negash and Tronvoll, supra note 55, p. 94.
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Tekie, a member of Eritrea’s Constitutional Commission, perhaps summarizes 
the perception in significant quarters in Eritrea:
The TPLF, after paying lip service to the birth of Eritrea, is now trying 
to snuff the life out of Eritrea’s sovereignty. Ethiopia’s rulers past and 
present share the lust for the land (of Eritrea) though the TPLF is more 
debilitating. 98
This kind of image painted by Eritrean opinion makers such as Professor Tekie 
seems to have been consciously created by the Government of Eritrea. An 
Eritrean I interviewed in Maiaynie refugee camp told me that as a young 
university graduate in the war years and even after that he would be required to 
paint this image of Ethiopia in weekly political indoctrination lessons at his 
workplace; he was required to incorporate in the ‘lessons’ how the rulers of 
Shoa and Tigray always tyrannized over Eritreans and that they still desire to do 
that. Perhaps in part owing to such indoctrination, even the common people 
seem to share or to have shared this outlook about Ethiopia’s intentions. 
Summarizing the outlook after the border war, Richard Reid observes that:
[the Eritrean society is broadly] governed by the notion of destiny 
usually, and increasingly couched in militaristic terms, and by a potent 
sense of isolation which rests on the belief that Eritrea can trust no-one, 
from Ethiopia to the ‘international community’; and thus ‘suffering and 
hardship’ have been and will be for some time to come the lot of the 
Eritrean people. 99
The field study confirms the prevalence of negative perceptions at the time of 
the war. Asked whether there were fears, during the war, that the real intention 
of the Ethiopian Government was to ‘re-occupy/dismember/destabilize Eritrea’ 
62 out of 94 of the respondents answered yes. Another rather surprising answer 
was asked whether Eritrean Government works to destabilize Ethiopia 44 out of 
84 Eritreans answered yes.
The overwhelming majority of the respondents being Eritrean refugees living 
in Ethiopia one cannot claim the foregoing perceptions are representative of the 
larger Eritrean society. They do however indicate that the perceptions about the 
intentions of Ethiopia on Eritrea have improved. in an interview with the 
Chairperson of Maiaynie refugee camp coordinating committee, a refugee 
himself, he told me that perceptions have improved greatly. He notes that the 
number of refugees who come to Ethiopia is a good indication, and this is so,
98 Tekie Fessehatzion (2002), Shattered Illusion, Broken Promise (Lawrenceville: Red 
Sea Press), p.252.
99 Richard Reid (2005), ‘Caught in the Headlights of History: Eritrea, the EPLF and the 
Post-War Nation-State’, Journal of Modern African Studies 43(3), p. 468.
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despite the intense propaganda by the Eritrean government that the Ethiopian 
government injects HIV into the body of Eritrean refugees and similar 
horrifying stories. According to him, a few years back many Eritreans feared 
coming to Ethiopia because of the negative perceptions actively fostered by 
Eritrea. Moreover, fleeing to Ethiopia was considered extremely unpatriotic, 
while today it is absolutely a different story.100
Similarly, a significant number of Ethiopians believed that Eritrea wished to 
manipulate the Ethiopian economy to the maximum benefit of Eritrea despite its 
declaration of sovereignty. Moreover, they believed, that Eritrea had an 
undeclared design to destabilize Ethiopia and weaken its economy through 
intermittent skirmishes which would sap the nation’s resources that are essential 
for development. Asked what the intentions of Eritrea were at the time of the 
war, 50 out of 70 Ethiopian respondents in the survey said that the Eritrean 
Government wanted to destabilize and dismember Ethiopia. They believe that 
Eritrea foments dissidence and insurgency in Ethiopia by training and arming 
various fundamentalist and separatist groups.101 Today, the perception has 
worsened. Asked about the current intentions of Eritrea, 52 out of 68 of 
Ethiopian respondents said Eritrea now works to destabilize and dismember 
Ethiopia. Many Ethiopians also contend that Eritrean daily broadcasts in several 
Ethiopian languages corroborate the existence of a design to destabilize 
Ethiopia.
3. The Boundary and Claims Commissions: A Cursory 
Look at Their Mandates and Awards
The two countries solely took a purely legalistic approach to solve their conflict. 
The Algiers agreement, signed on December 12, 2000, which terminated the war 
provided for the establishment of two arbitral tribunals: the Boundary 
Commission and the Claims Commission.102 Each had to base all its decisions 
on relevant rules of international law. Particularly, the Boundary Commission 
was given mandate to delimit and demarcate the border between the two 
countries on the basis of the 1900, 1902 and 1908 treaties between Italy and 
Ethiopia and applicable international law.103 Similarly, the Claims Commission 
had the mandate to give awards on all claims for loss, damage or injury resulting 
from104 (a) the actions of one government against the other, (b) the actions of the
0 Interview with Misgina MaiAyni Refugee Camp, February 22, 2010.
101 Paul B. Henz, Eritrea’s War Against Ethiopia: Causes and Effects, Reflections,
Perspectives at <http://www.fas.org.7man/dod-101/ops/war/docs/02501001 .htm> 
The Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea, Articles 4 and 5.
102
103Id. Art 4(2).
* Ibid. Art. 5(1).
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nationals of either party against the government or entities owned by the other 
government, and (c) violations of international humanitarian law. The Tribunal 
did not have jurisdiction to hear claims arising from the cost of military 
operations, preparing for military operations or the use of force, except to the 
extent that such claims involved violation of international humanitarian law.105 
Neither Commission had the power to make decisions ex aequo et bono. 106
The Boundary Commission embarked on its task by underscoring that it will 
stick to the terms of the Algiers agreement and rely on the three boundary 
treaties and international law, with a caveat that international law attaches 
significance to the conduct of parties to a treaty subsequent to conclusion of a 
treaty. It observed107:
The effect of a subsequent conduct may be so clear in relation to matters 
that appear to be the subject of a given treaty that the application of an 
otherwise pertinent treaty provision may be varied.... The nature and 
extent of the conduct effective to produce a variation is, of course, a 
matter of appreciation by the tribunal in each case.
On the basis of the above understanding of its mandate and applicable rules, it 
considered the claims of each side as to where exactly the boundary between the 
two countries should be. It then rendered its decision on April 13, 2002. The 
scope of this article does not allow delving into the details of the decision other 
than a brief indication of two points. The first is that each state won some 
territories the other had claimed, and the territories won or lost by each were not 
particularly vast or endowed with proven resources. The second is that Badme 
the flashpoint of the conflict was awarded to Eritrea although this was not 
clearly mentioned in the award itself.108
As regards the work of the Claims Commission, one should note that the 
issues pending before it were many, diverse and complex. Dealing in detail with 
the claims of each country is clearly beyond the themes of this article. Hence, 
we will be confined to highlighting the types of claims and the awards given.
105 Id.
106 Id. Art. Art 4(2) and 5(13).
107 Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission Decision Regarding the Delimitation of the 
Border Between the State of Eritrea and The Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia, Paragraphs 3.8 and 3.9 (pages 22 and 23) available at: <http://www.eritrea- 
hilfswerk.de/fileadmin/Daten/pdf/eebc_decision-l.pdf> Accessed on May 4, 2012.
108 Ibid, Par 8.1 and 8. 2 (pp. 97 to104). For a quick view of the final boundary decision 
one is advised to look at these pages and maps 10, 11 and 12 included in the award 
of the Commission itself.
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Ethiopia claimed, among other things, that Eritrea waged war against it in 
violation of the UN Charter that bans the use of force.109 The claim accuses 
Eritrea of violation of the laws of war and killed, raped, tortured, abducted, 
physically and mentally abused, forcefully displaced, interned, subjected to 
frequent beatings, Ethiopians in Ethiopian territory it occupied in the initial 
months of the war and within Eritrea. Ethiopia further claimed that Eritrea was 
engaged in shelling and aerial bombardment of civilian targets. Ethiopia’s 
contention was that in the aggregate, almost 242,000 people were potentially 
exposed to these violations.110
Other claims included execution and mistreatment of Ethiopian prisoners of 
war,111 confiscation of cargoes from Ethiopia that were in Eritrean ports at the 
start of the war, taking property of Ethiopians in Eritrea112, causing economic 
loss throughout Ethiopia by starting the war,113 and mistreatment of Ethiopian 
Embassy personnel and interference with access to Ethiopian Embassy in 
Eritrea.114 On the basis of the above allegations, Ethiopia claimed total damages 
amounting to 14.3 billion USD. This amount, according to the Claims 
Commission, was more than three times the Gross National Product of Eritrea in 
2005 measured on purchasing power parity.115
Eritrea on its part claimed, among other things, that Ethiopia breached the 
laws of war especially after occupying Eritrean territory following its May 2000 
offensive. The claims included destruction and looting of property, abuse of 
civilians which in some instances like Teseney and Barentu included rape, and 
shooting of civilians.116 Eritrea claimed that Ethiopia caused internal 
displacement of thousands of civilians in Eritrea and prevented their return to 
their homes.117 Eritrea further claimed that Ethiopia engaged in aerial 
bombardment of six towns causing civilian casualties and loss of property, 
targeting infrastructure, for instance, water reservoir and power station near 
Assab and Massawa respectively.118 Other claims stated that Ethiopian troops 
were engaged in desecration of cemetery of Eritrean patriots and have damaged 
the historic stela at Matara.119 Yet another major claim of Eritrea was that 
Ethiopia violated the rights of Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin living
109 Jus AdBellum, Ethiopia’s Claim 1-8.
110 Final Award for Ethiopia paragraphs 76 and 77.
111 Ethiopia’s Claim 4.
112 Ethiopia’s Claim 6.
113 Ethiopia’s Claim 7.
114 Ethiopia’s Claim 8.
115 Damage Award for Ethiopia, Section III, Paragraph 18.
116 Eritrea’s Claim 3 paragraphs 26 and 28.
117 Eritrea’s Claim 14, Paragraph 122 and Claim 21, Paragraph 131.
118 Eritrea’s Claim 26, Paragraph 99 and 107.
119 Eritrea’s Claims 2,4,6,7,8 and 22.
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in Ethiopia at the outbreak of the war by wrongfully denationalizing them, 
expelling them en mass, detaining them without due process and depriving them 
of their property in violation of international legal obligations. Regarding the 
numbers affected, Eritrea alleged that 75,000 persons were expelled from 
Ethiopia.120 Other claims of Eritrea included deliberate killing, physical and 
mental abuse of Eritrean prisoners of war, that Ethiopia ceased to pay pension to 
Eritreans who were in the service of the Ethiopian state prior to the 
independence of Eritrea121 and that Ethiopia was engaged in a systematic 
confiscation of business, real property, trucks and other property of Eritreans in 
Ethiopia.122 On the basis of these claims, among others, Eritrea requested an 
award approaching 6 billion USD against Ethiopia.123
The Commission decided on each claim and gave awards. The awards given 
in respect of each claim filed by the two countries are voluminous and they 
cannot be presented in meaningful details here. we thus confine ourselves to 
highlighting five observations. These are124:
a) Neither side got all it wanted. In fact, both sides were found to have 
committed serious violations of international humanitarian law;
b) The violations of international humanitarian law committed by Eritrea 
were in some sense more egregious as they were mostly directed at the 
life and limb of the victims. The Commission found Eritrea liable for 
severe crimes like unlawfully killing or permitting the killing, rape and 
abduction of civilians. it also found it liable for abuse and improper care 
for Ethiopian prisoners of war and failure to give proper protection to 
civilians it expelled in addition to looting civilian property.
c) The Commission found Ethiopia liable for failure to give proper 
protection and treatment to Eritrean prisoners of war, for indoctrinating 
them, for improperly detaining and expelling Eritreans from its territory, 
engaging in looting and unlawful destruction of property.
120 Eritrea’s Claims 15, 16, 23, 27, and 32.
121 Eritrea’s Claims 15, 17 par 3, 19 and 23.
122 Eritrea’s Claim 24.
123 Eritrea Final Award for Damages , Paragraph 18.
124 Read the awards available at: <http://www.pcacpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=115>,
accessed on May 15,2012. Of particular interest in this regard are: Partial award, 
Western and Eastern Front-Ethiopia’s Claims 1 and 3, Partial Award: Central Front- 
Ethiopia’s Claim 2, Partial Award: Prisoners of War:-Ethiopia’s Claim 4, Partial 
Award: Civilian Claims- Ethiopia’s Claim 5, Partial Award: Prisoners of war-
Eritrea’s Claim 17, Partial Award: Central Front-Eritrea’s Claims 2,4,6,7,8 and 22, 
Partial Award: Civilian Claims-Eritrea’s Claims 15,16,23, and 27-32, Partial Award 
Jus Ad Bellum, Ethiopia’s Claims 1-8; Final Award Eritrea’s Damages Claim Sec 
IX, Parag 21; Ethiopia’s Damages Claims Final Award, Sec XII E.
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d) The Commission found Eritrea liable for starting the war in violation of 
Article 2 paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations by resorting 
to the use of force; and,
e) On the basis of the foregoing findings, among others, and on the basis of 
its understanding of the rules of international law dealing with 
determination of the quantum of compensation it awarded Ethiopia a 
total monetary compensation of USD 174,036,520; and it awarded 
Eritrea and its named nationals a total of USD 163,520,865.
4. The Mismatch between the Eritrea-Ethiopia Conflict and 
Its Arbitration
According to Wallensteen, conflict resolution is a situation “where the conflicting 
parties enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, accept 
each other’s continued existence as parties and cease all violent action against 
each other”.125 In the context of conflict resolution, acceptance of each other’s 
continued existence implies a situation wherein parties to the conflict accept 
each other as parties to future dealings with one another.126 Conflict resolution 
also means more than the absence of war or fighting. The parties are agreeing to 
respect each other and to live together. However, it may or may not include 
broader meanings of peace such as cooperation, integration and justice.127
Contemporary views of conflict resolution take a broad view of the nature 
and timing of intervention in conflicts. While the classical view of conflict 
resolution focused on intervention addressed at the core parties to the violent 
conflict, the contemporary view emphasizes the ‘bottom-up’ process.128 In 
general, there has been a shift from seeing a third party intervention as the 
primary responsibility of outsiders to appreciating the role of indigenous 
peacemakers. Instead of outsiders offering a solution to a conflict say in one- 
shot arbitration or even mediation, the emphasis is now on the need to build 
constituencies and capacity within societies that aim at managing conflicts in a 
sustained way.129
The idea behind this approach is that in societies or even countries that are in 
conflict you have people involved in the conflict to different degrees. Certain 
segments of the society will be more invested in the conflict than others. You 
will thus have core parties to the conflict, at the very center of the conflict. Next 
to this layer you will have actively influential parties, the second layer. The third
125
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layer consists of marginal parties to the conflict. The fourth layer may consist of 
‘uninvolved’ parties. This latter group is a party to the conflict in a minimal 
sense and is not meaningfully absorbed in the conflict. All these groups can play 
their own roles in resolving a conflict. In other words, the new approach sees 
working from the outside layer towards the key or core parties to the conflict as 
an option that has to be taken in tandem with focusing on the core group.130 The 
essence of this new approach is that there are various tracks to conflict 
resolution. For instance, where two countries are involved in a conflict, you 
could work on the top leaders in the two countries. This is Track I. You can also 
work with middle level leaders in the two countries with the assistance of say 
international NGOs, churches, academics, Track II. Further down it is possible 
to work at local community level or at grassroots, Track III.131
In all the three tracks to peace what needs to be done to attain resolution of 
conflict could vary depending on the type and extent of the conflict. Where the 
conflict had emotional/identity dimension, for example, concrete steps must be 
taken to address the need for recognition, esteem and respect for each of the 
parties. Hence, for example, where the conflict resulted in death or created other 
injures steps must be taken to condemn the injustice, bring perpetrators to 
justice and as far as practicable ‘compensate’ the victim or show empathy and 
recognition. In other words, rectificatory justice is important. Mani writes this 
type of justice after conflict could have three rationales, namely, legal, political 
and psychosocial.132
Track II and III methods, also known as Track II and III diplomacy, 
complement the official Track I method that focuses on government to 
government relations. This is so because the two routes have the potential to 
provide social, psychological and spiritual support for the peace building 
endeavor. As a result of this process, some of the basic self-esteem (identity) 
and security needs of the parties are satisfied and wrong perceptions 
dispelled.133 134 On top of this, in more general ways, Track II and III diplomacy 
assists political leaders by compensating for the constraints imposed on them by 
the understandable pressure exerted on leaders to be strong in the face of the 
enemy. In other words, they foster a political environment through the education 
of public opinion that would make it safer for political leaders to take risks for
134peace.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid, p. 26.
132 Rama Mani (2002), Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War 
(Malden: Polity Press), p. 7. See also Rothman and Olson, supra note 76, p. 295.
133 Olga Botcharova, ‘Implementation of Track II Diplomacy: Developing a Model of 
Forgiveness’, in Helmick and Rodney (eds.), supra note 77, p. 284.
134 Ibid.
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Arbitration is settlement of a dispute by a binding award rendered by an 
entity that is granted with such powers by the parties themselves. The award is 
arrived at by authoritative legal process and by considering the merits of the 
opposing positions.135 It is used when parties to a dispute opt to handle the 
conflict by legal means and precedent rather than by more political means. As a 
result, it allows a vindication of a winner and the humiliation of the loser.136 If 
objective elements linked to resources are predominant at a given point, then 
third party methods that facilitate a compromise or provide a judgment are 
appropriate. So, arbitration could be appropriate for disputes which focus on 
resource allocation. if on the other hand subjective elements such as 
misperception, emotions and miscommunication predominate, then third party 
activities that improve the relationship and induce problem-solving are more 
appropriate.137 As Bercovitch points out, as an international conflict escalates 
and de-escalates, different interventions will be appropriate at different stages.138
With the benefit of hindsight one can contend that it was wrong for the peace 
deal to choose to resolve the boundary problem by arbitration.139 According to 
Zondi and Rejouis, by opting for this method Ethiopia and Eritrea actually chose 
‘conflict settlement’ over ‘conflict resolution’. For them, conflict resolution is 
based on an analytical approach to get to the underlying causes of the problem 
and bring about permanent solution which as far as possible produces a win-win 
ending.140 So, although the choice of arbitration may have been motivated by 
expectations that the ruling might well be just, fair and, therefore acceptable to 
both parties, this winner-loser route at least in the case between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia has probably prolonged the conflict rather than resolve it.141
in fact, arbitration could even be another way of continuing the conflict as 
each side may go for arbitration in the hope that the outcome will justify the 
human and material costs of a war. in part because of this, arbitration on the 
boundary problem after a full-fledged war may be of doubtful utility. It has the 
potential for complicating matters further as it can produce results that fly on the 
face of the outcome of the fighting as was the case here. Ethiopia was literally 
required to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory which is politically extremely
135
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difficult to stomach.142 Regarding the Claims Commission, one easily notices 
that most of the matters brought to it were not really resource related. So, the 
observation that arbitration is inappropriate for non-resource focused conflict 
holds true as briefly shown below.
5. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Conflict: The Three Dimensions 
of Resolution
As Mayer observes, the dimensions of resolution depend on the dimensions of 
conflict. That is, the process of resolution occurs along emotional, cognitive, 
and behavioral dimensions.143 In what follows, we will look at these three 
dimensions of resolution and examine the ways in which the Eritrea-Ethiopia 
conflict can reach resolution in each of these dimensions.
5.1. Emotional Resolution
The emotional dimension of resolution involves both the way disputants feel 
about the conflict and the amount of emotional energy they put into it.144 If 
people experience the feelings associated with a conflict at high level of 
intensity, for example, same as when they were fully engaged, there is no 
emotional resolution.145 Although it may be easier to think of emotional 
resolution in terms of experience of individuals, the concept applies to systems 
as well.146 Unfortunately, in spite of the peace deal, arbitral awards on the 
disputed border and socio-economic claims, the level of misunderstanding and 
resentment between the two countries and people is still high. This, of course, is 
not the same for every segment of the people in both countries. Moreover, it 
does appear that emotions are subsiding among certain sections of the societies 
in the two countries though not to the desirable level.147
How can then those involved get over this, and look forward? Volkan 
suggests mourning. He observes that human nature gives this painful but 
ultimately effective way to let go of previous attachments, to adjust internally to
142 Healy and Plaut, supra note 139, p.9.
143 Mayer, supra note 15, p. 98.
144 Ibid, p. 100.
145 Ibid, p.101.
146 Ibid, p. 103.
147 Reid, supra note 99, p. 476. According to him young, educated, urban Eritreans are 
increasingly blaming the Eritrean Government, rather than Ethiopia, for what went 
wrong while rural Eritreans and the older struggle generation, tegadelti remain 
apologetic. Similarly, informal discussions the author of this piece had with 
Ethiopians show that emotions in certain quarters still remain high though lower 
than previously. The closer one goes to the border the more intense the emotions.
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the absence of lost people or things and to get on with the future. He observes 
that humans cannot accept change without mourning what has been lost.148 Like 
individuals or families, large groups also mourn. Members of a group who share 
the same loss collectively go through a similar psychological mourning 
process.149 However, in some situations a shared calamity can leave members of 
a group “dazed, helpless and too afraid and angry to complete or even initiate a 
mourning process”.150 When this happens, the large group that survived the 
ordeal passes down the memory of the tragedy and its feelings about it to its 
descendants.151
How can this be avoided in the Ethiopia-Eritrea context? How can the people 
of the two countries mourn their past losses so that they do not induce feelings 
of anger, humiliation and desire for revenge in the future generations? Religious 
leaders in both countries can play critical role in this regard. This could be by 
cultivating the culture of forgiveness, encouraging people to people contacts and 
teaching the need for peace. one recalls the initiatives by the religious leaders of 
the two countries with the assistance of the Norwegian Aid.152 Elders from both 
countries too can have a critical role.
Another but related method is suggested by Rothman and olson. They 
suggest what they call ‘resonance phase’ as a starting point for the resolution of 
identity-based conflict. In this phase, disputants reflexively articulate their core 
concerns sought, threatened or frustrated within the conflict first to themselves 
and then to each other.153 The second element of this refers to affording 
opportunity to groups in conflict the chance to get the other’s views regarding 
the causes of the conflict and what happened during the conflict. This implies 
that there should be interaction between members of the two groups in conflict 
to dispel the rigid views maintained by each regarding who is responsible and 
how to rectify the situation. in other words, where there is no interaction 
between the two groups, the desired outcomes to the conflict are seen in zero- 
sum terms by each group because each side has expelled the other and the 
experiences of the other from one’s assessment of what is ‘right’.154 It is only 
after this has been done that the disputants can ask what they can do about their 
identities which are in confrontation. This process will enable the parties realize
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that their identities are not mutually exclusive. Through this process they 
discover that their identities have points in which they mesh.155
People of the two countries should thus engage in in-depth discussion about 
the conflict instead of trying to forget about it. They should make known first to 
themselves and then interactively to each other the details of what were lost (in 
terms of life, liberty, property, opportunities etc...) on both sides. This may be 
done by organizing fora first in each country for this purpose. Then the 
discussion should involve people from both countries interacting with each 
other. For instance, both victims and perpetrators of wrong from both sides 
could express their feelings and motives in a forum similar to say the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. The South African Commission 
was mandated with establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, 
nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights committed by all the 
parties to the conflict in South Africa. To this end, it conducted hearings and 
investigations and exposed various violations of human rights including the 
antecedents, circumstances, factors and context of such violations as well as the 
perspectives of victims and the motives of perpetrators of the crimes.156 What is 
more, it worked with the aim of restoring the human and civil dignity of victims 
by granting them an opportunity to relate their own accounts of the violations of 
human rights and by recommending reparation in respect of them.157
Similar fora would certainly be helpful, as having an opportunity to express 
feelings and having them acknowledged by others is frequently an important 
part of reaching emotional closure.158 A question that one may raise here is 
whether these multifaceted steps can really be taken given the narrow political 
space in the two countries. Unfortunately, at this point in time, the political 
space in the two countries is not wide enough for private citizens to fully engage 
in such activities.159 But this should not be an excuse for sitting idle. No matter 
how little it might appear, whatsoever is possible should be done because every 
little step in the right direction helps. This, of course, should be in tandem with 
working for the widening of political space necessary for such exercises.
155 Rothman and Olson, supra note 76, p. 298.
156 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995, Art. 3(1)(a). 
<http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/legal/act9534.htm>, accessed on October 30, 2009.
157 htt://www.doj.gov.za/trc/special/index.htm, accessed on October 19, 2009.
158 Mayer, supra note 15, p. 103.
159 For instance, Freedom House in its 2012 report categorizes Ethiopia as ‘not free’, 
with scores of 6 each for civil liberties and political rights, 7 being the worst possible 
score any country can get. Eritrea is considered to be even worse, scoring 7 each on 
political liberties and civil rights, hence ‘qualifying’ to the club dubbed ‘the worst of 
the worst’, Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2012, 
<www.freedomhouse.org|report|freedom-world|freedom-world-2012>.
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Anyway, freedom is always to be claimed by the citizen, not bestowed by those 
in power.
Volkan suggests yet another path in addressing such dark chapters of the past 
in which a group or its leader asks for forgiveness from another group. He, 
however, cautions that this is effective only if the wronged group has already 
done a sufficient amount of mourning.160 Although admission of the commission 
of wrongs is helpful, the desired effects materialize only if such admissions are 
mutual, complete and widely publicized in the fora prepared for that purpose. 
Perhaps, this may be attempted in the Ethio-Eritrean context as long as the 
apology and forgiveness are genuinely offered.
5.2. Cognitive Resolution
From the cognitive dimension of a conflict follows the cognitive dimension of 
resolution. in other words, as the mental image or perception of people is a 
cause of conflict, it must be addressed as a necessary part of conflict resolution. 
As the UNESCO Constitution correctly puts it, “wars are made in the minds of 
men, and it is in the minds of men that the defense of peace must be 
constructed”.161 Mayer notes that cognitive resolution occurs when the 
disputants believe that their key issues have been addressed. When a complete 
resolution in this dimension is attained, parties to a conflict change their 
essential views of the people with whom they are at conflict, the nature of the 
conflict or the issues themselves.162 In other words, disputants view the conflict 
as part of their past as opposed to their future.163
Assessment of the reality on the ground gives mixed results at best. 
Significant forces in Eritrea and Ethiopia still believe that the relationship is not 
improving as desired and will not improve that much in the near future. 
Evaluating the situation in Eritrea in 2005, Reid says, in the views of Eritreans, 
especially the struggle generation, no political, social or even economic 
development will take place unless Ethiopia is defeated militarily.164 The 
outcome of an online poll conducted by an Eritrean opposition website in the 
summer of 2012 indicates that some segments of the Eritrean society still 
envisage an outbreak of a full-fledged war as a possibility. Asked “what is the 
likelihood of full war breaking between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2012”, 259 
respondents (13% of those who responded to the question) answered “very 
high” while another 267 persons (yet another 13%) responded “high”. 951 and
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429 persons regarded the possibility as “very low” and “low” respectively.165 
Although a clear majority of respondents believed that the possibility is very 
low and low, it should be noted that the question was about the possibility of 
full-fledged war between the two countries in 2012. This does not thus disprove 
the observations of Reid regarding the thoughts of a significant number of 
Eritreans about a renewed war as a possibility, if not a probability, in the near 
future.
in contrast to public opinion in Eritrea, the Ethiopian public shows a general 
tendency of forgetting away166 the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict while the Ethiopian 
government oscillates between containment and taking proactive defensive 
measures. Talking to the media on March 12, 2011, the late Prime Minster 
Meles Zenawi indicated that the policy of Ethiopia (until that time) had been 
foiling terrorist and other attacks sponsored by Eritrea. He however, added “it is 
now difficult to hold down this force of destruction only guarding our borders”. 
There should be, he continued, an effort to change either the policy of the 
Eritrean Government or the regime itself.167 The raids Ethiopia conducted inside 
Eritrea in March 2012 to wipeout what it called ‘training camps for subversive 
groups’168 can be understood in light of this change of strategy.
On the side of the Government of Eritrea the perception seems to be going 
from bad to worse. On March 24, 2011 the Ambassador of Eritrea to the United 
Nations, Araya Desta wrote to the President of the Security Council that 
Ethiopia has been pursuing, during the past ten years “an active policy of 
subversion and hostility against Eritrea under the rubric of regime change”. The 
Ambassador then reminded the President of the arms embargo the Security 
Council ‘unjustifiably’ imposed on Eritrea in December 2009 and warned that 
the embargo might encourage Ethiopia to contemplate reckless acts of further 
aggression against Eritrea.169
The foregoing statements show that interventions at top level are difficult at 
least in the short run. This does not, however, mean that intervention in this 
track is entirely impossible. in fact, there are signs of conciliatory tone at the 
level of the political leadership. For example, in a recent interview with
5 <www.awate.com> accessed on August 2, 2012. The total number of respondent as 
of this date was 2,022.
166 Eritrean refugees whom the author met in Addis Ababa told him that they are 
bewildered to meet some Ethiopians who ask them whether they came from Asmara 
by plane ignorant that such thing is unthinkable.
167 Addis Fortune, Weekly Newspaper published in English, Vol. 11, No. 568, March 
20, 2011, p. 46.
168 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17386161>, accessed on August 14, 2012.
169 <http://www.embassyeritrea.org/pressstatement /2011_March 24 ADesta PermRep 
of Eri2UN letter.pdf> .
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Aljezeera, Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn said that “If you ask me, ‘Do 
you want to go to Asmara and sit down and negotiate with Isaias Afwerki?’ 
Then, I will say yes.”170 He further noted that the late Prime Minister Meles 
Zenawi had a similar position, and said that both sides need to have the same 
position for this to materialize.
Yet, a solid achievement in this realm seems to be difficult in the short run. 
Hence, a wide range of conflict resolution mechanisms focusing on mid and 
grassroots levels, i.e Track II and Track III diplomacy, should become current 
priorities toward attaining resolution on the cognitive dimension of the conflict. 
This is not, however, to suggest that efforts need not be exerted at the level of 
the two governments (Track I). In fact, efforts at Tracks II and III are not 
substitutes for the engagement of governments (Track I), but rather aim at 
enabling the governments address the conflict.
As these tracks are underway, there should also be sub-regional, regional and 
global efforts to encourage and facilitate the resolution of the conflict. With 
regard to regional intervention, Getahun Seifu, suggests “intervention by the AU 
mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution”.171 In this 
regard, he points out the challenges that AU may encounter in the process such 
as the criticism for not defending the arbitral ruling based on the Algiers 
agreement and the accusation of undue influence by Ethiopia on the African 
Commission.172 Yet, he suggests that “AU should leave no stone unturned to 
intervene in the Ethio-Eritrean conflict”, and that “[i]t is in the best interest of 
the AU (as well as the conflicting parties) to immediately ... seek peaceful 
resolution”.173
5.3. Behavioral Resolution
We usually focus on the behavioral dimension of conflict when we think of its 
resolution. We think of resolution “as being about what people will do (or not 
do) or what agreements they will make about what they will do”.174 According 
to Mayer, behavioral resolution has two aspects. The first refers to discontinuing
170 Interview with Aljezeera, December 8th 2012, 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2012/12/20121271035462768 
7.html>, Accessed: 10 Dec. 2012.
171 Getahun Seifu (2012), “Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict: Options for African 
Commission Intervention” in Managing Peace and Security in Africa: Essays on 
Approaches to Interventions in African Conflicts ”, (The Africa Peace and Security 
Programme, Institute for Peace and security studies, Addis Ababa University, 
Selected Cases in Africa, December 2012), p. 146.
172 Ibid, p. 179.
173 Ibid, p. 180.
174 Mayer, supra note 15, p.106.
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the conflict behavior, and its second aspect is related with instituting actions to 
promote resolution. He notes that “stopping fighting is one part of behavioral 
resolution, taking steps to meet each other’s needs and implement a new mode 
of interaction is another”.175 Mayer further observes that unless we are dealing 
with a conflict in which there will be no future interdependence or interaction 
among the disputants and in which nothing more than the cessation of certain 
behavior is necessary to end the conflict, then it is important to address both 
elements of the behavioral dimension to reach a full resolution.176
The Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict resolution must envisage the inevitability of 
future interaction and interdependence. This is admitted even by the late Tekie 
Fissehazion who was strongly opposed to any form of political union between 
the two countries. For instance, he is quoted as having stated that “Eritrea is not 
just another country. History, location and happenstance have contributed to the 
creation of an economic region that traverses political boundaries, so much so 
that economically Northern Ethiopia and Eritrea are like two siamese twins 
joined at the back and mutually looking in opposite directions”. 177
This, no doubt, is a correct observation. Thus, behavioral resolution of the 
conflict will require taking steps to meet each other’s needs and to implement a 
new mode of interaction between the two countries. At this juncture, it is 
necessary to remember that the issues that were lurking behind the border 
conflict were issues like commodity trade, monetary arrangements and use of 
ports. So, behavioral resolution of the conflict calls for entering into a 
comprehensive economic cooperation that includes trade, investment, use of 
ports, and the mobility of people on openly negotiated terms that are fair to both 
sides.
Conclusion
The Conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea is a conflict which has emotional, 
cognitive as well as behavioral dimensions. Arbitration as the sole means of 
conflict resolution on the basis of authoritative legal standards is not effective 
for a conflict that is permeated by emotions and adverse perceptions. Yet, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea opted for binding arbitration as the sole mechanism of 
conflict resolution. Apparently, this choice was based neither on satisfactory 
analysis of the causes of the conflict nor on the prognosis of the role arbitration 
would play in resolving the conflict. Hence, in spite of the awards rendered by
175 Ibid, p. 107.
176 Ibid, p. 108.
177 Tekeste Negash and Tronvoll, supra note 55, p. 92, See also Amare Tekle (1994) 
Ethiopia and Eritrea: From Conflict to Cooperation (Lawrenceville: The Red Sea 
Press), p. 69.
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the Boundary and Claims Commissions, the conflict remains unresolved. In fact, 
since both Commissions have decided for each side on some of the issues 
presented to them, each side is cherry-picking parts of the awards that are 
favorable to it and using the same for propaganda to fuel the conflict.
To make progress in all the dimensions of conflict resolution, all 
stakeholders, and particularly the citizens of the two countries, should be aware 
that there are multiple tracks to conflict resolution and take matters into their 
own hands. They should not expect that the governments of the two countries 
will, for that matter can, resolve every dimension of the conflict one fine 
morning. Given the current nature and relationship of the political leaderships in 
the two countries, the approach to the resolution of the conflict should be 
initiated and steadily nurtured ‘bottom-up’. _________ ■
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